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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of robust clock phase offset estimation for the IEEE 1588 precision
time protocol (PTP) in the presence of delay attacks. Delay attacks are one of the most effective cyber
attacks in PTP, as they cannot be mitigated using typical security measures. In this paper, we consider
the case where the slave node can exchange synchronization messages with multiple master nodes
synchronized to the same clock. We first provide lower bounds on the best achievable performance for
any phase offset estimation scheme in the presence of delay attacks. We then present a novel phase
offset estimation scheme that employs the Expectation-Maximization algorithm for detecting which of
the master-slave communication links have been subject to delay attacks. After discarding information
from the links identified as attacked, which we show to be optimal, the optimal vector location parameter
estimator is employed to estimate the phase offset of the slave node. Simulation results are presented to
show that the proposed phase offset estimation scheme exhibits performance close to the lower bounds
in a wide variety of scenarios.
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Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to precisely synchronize clocks among distributed components is critical in many
vital fields such as electrical power systems, industrial automation, and telecommunications.
The IEEE 1588 “Precision Time Protocol” (PTP) [1] is a widely used clock synchronization
protocol for networked measurement and control systems. Although existing protocols such as
the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [2] and the Global Positioning System (GPS) are available
for synchronizing clocks in some cases, PTP offers an inexpensive alternative achieving sub-
microsecond precision in meaningful scenarios. NTP restricts the underlying network to be
IP-based, while GPS requires line-of-sight. PTP does not have these restrictions and is often far
more cost effective in many applications. In fact, packet-based synchronization techniques based
on PTP are a frequently employed alternative for achieving synchronization in many applications.
For example, PTP is extremely popular in powerline networks [3], and in backhaul networks
employed for connecting cell towers in 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile networks [4].
In PTP, as with any two-way message exchange schemes, the slave node exchanges a series
of synchronization packets with its master node so the packet timestamps can be employed to
estimate the phase offset relative to the master node. The synchronization packets can encounter
several intermediate switches and routers along the network path between the master and the slave
node. The main factors contributing to the overall end-to-end delay for a synchronization packet
are the constant propagation delay over the entire path, the processing delays at the intermediate
nodes, and the random queuing delays at each such node. The problem of estimating the phase
offset of the slave node in the presence of random queuing delays is referred to as the phase
offset estimation (POE) problem [5].
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Due to their widespread use, synchronization protocols such as PTP could become the target
for attackers trying to disrupt a network. One of the most effective cyber attacks threatening
PTP is the delay attack [6]. In a delay attack, a malicious intermediate node deliberately delays
the transmission of synchronization messages in order to alter the estimated phase offset at the
slave node. In this paper, we consider developing robust POE schemes to combat delay attacks.
Garderer et. al [7] – [9] studied various security aspects of clock synchronization in PTP.
They proposed an idea of using a group of masters rather than a single master for synchronizing
the slave node. The group of masters coordinate in a first stage of their approach. Afterwards,
a speaker node representing the group exchanges timing messages with the slave node. The
proposed POE scheme works in the presence of a master failure, or a malicious master, however
it requires prior information regarding the number of master nodes that have been attacked or
failed. This information might not be available in many scenarios.
Sun et. al [10] proposed a robust POE scheme that uses the median of the observed timing
offsets from different master nodes to estimate the phase offset. The proposed POE scheme
is robust to attacks, however there is a loss in performance due to the significant amount of
information being discarded. Song et. al [11] proposed a robust POE scheme that employs
the Grubb outliers test to identify the observations that have been attacked. After discarding the
observations identified as attacked, the phase offset is estimated from the remaining observations
using the sample mean estimator.
Mizrahi [12] – [13] proposed a POE scheme that uses multiple master-slave communication
links to improve the accuracy of the phase offset estimate. They also discussed using multiple
master-slave communication links to help protect against delay attacks. In the proposed POE
scheme, the slave node initially estimates the phase offset corresponding to each master-slave
communication link. A master-slave communication link is identified as attacked, if the difference
between its phase offset estimate and the average of the remaining phase offset estimates is
greater than a certain threshold. The information from links identified as attacked are discarded
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and the phase offset is estimated using information from the unattacked links. In the above POE
schemes [7] – [13], the information from multiple unattacked sources are fused using the sample
mean estimator. Though asymptotically consistent, the sample mean estimator might not be the
optimal approach for fusing information in many scenarios with a finite number of observations.
Building on the work of [12] – [13], in the presented work, we consider the case where the
slave node communicates with multiple master nodes whose clocks are already synchronized. We
assume that fewer than half of the master-slave links are attacked1. Under the stated assumptions,
we first derive a lower bound on the best achievable performance for any POE scheme in the
presence of delay attacks by extending the work done in [5]. We then present a novel robust
POE scheme to combat delay attacks in LTE backhaul networks.
Under these assumptions, we present a POE scheme that does not require prior information
regarding the number of master-slave communication links that are attacked and employs the
optimal approach for fusing information from unattacked multiple master nodes if the probability
density functions (pdf) are estimated correctly. In backhaul networks, the background traffic
from other users in the network often results in random queuing delays for the synchronization
messages. Based on previous simulation studies [14] – [16], we model the density function of
the random queuing delays as a mixture of Gamma random variables, a very general model.
Using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, our POE approach will first determine the
master-slave communication links which are compromised due to delay attacks. At the same time,
the EM algorithm will estimate the mixture coefficients describing the pdf of the random queuing
delays [17]. Then motivated by [18], we only use the information from links determined to be
unattacked to estimate the phase offset. We employ the optimal estimator for fusing information
from the unattacked links. We carry out extensive simulations to examine the performance of
1Either this or some information must be provided to allow the estimator to distinugush between sets of unattacked and sets
of similarly attacked links.
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the proposed POE scheme under various scenarios in the presence of delay attacks. Simulation
results show that the proposed POE scheme performs better than the conventional POE schemes
available in the literature and exhibits a mean square estimation error close to the lower bounds
in a wide variety of scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly discuss PTP and the
considered problem statement. In Section III, we describe the EM-algorithm used for identifying
the attacked links and the mixture components, along with the optimal approach for fusing
information from multiple master nodes which are unattacked and the pdfs are all estimated
correctly. In Section IV, we give some numerical results highlighting the performance of the
proposed approach. Finally in Section V, we present our conclusions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we briefly describe the two-way message exchange mechanism employed in
PTP, along with the considered problem statement. We assume the slave node can exchange
synchronization messages with N master nodes synchronized to the same clock. Assuming a
total of P rounds of two-way message exchanges between the slave and each master node;
the following sequence of messages are exchanged between the ith master node and the slave
during the jth round of message exchange. The master node initiates the exchange by sending
a sync packet to the slave at time t1ij . The value of t1ij is later communicated to the slave via
a follow up message. The slave node records the time of reception of the sync message as t2ij
and sends a delay req message to the master at time t3ij . The master records the time of arrival
of the delay req packet at time t4ij and this value is later communicated to the slave using a
delay resp packet. This procedure can be mathematically modeled as [5], [19]– [20]
uij = di + δ + w1ij, (1)
vij = di − δ + w2ij, (2)
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where uij = (t2ij − t1ij) and vij = (t4ij − t3ij) in (1) and (2). δ denotes the unknown phase
offset between the master and slave node clocks, di is the unknown fixed delay at the ith master-
slave communication link, {w1ij, w2ij} represent the random queuing delays in the forward- and
reverse-path respectively. The random queuing delays {wkij}Pj=1 have a pdf given by fki(w) for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N and k = 1, 2. To launch a delay attack at the ith master-slave link, a malicious
node adds a finite amount of constant delay to either the forward or reverse path, so we have
uij = (di + δ + w1ij + τi) , (3)
vij = (di − δ + w2ij) , (4)
where the variable τi represents the magnitude of the delay attack2. When the ith master-slave
link is not attacked, the forward-path delay uij has a pdf given by fuij(uij|di, δ) = f1i(uij−di−δ)
which depends on the unknown parameters di and δ. When the ith master-slave link is attacked,
uij has a pdf given by fuij(uij|di, δ, τi) = f1i(uij − di− δ− τi). Similarly, the reverse-path delay
vij has a pdf given by fvij(vij|di, δ) = f2i(vij − di + δ) depending on the unknown parameters
di and δ. In this paper, we model the random queuing delays in the backhaul networks as a
mixture of Gamma random variables to allow a very general representation which fits data from
realistic simulations well [14] – [16]. This approximation is useful in scenarios where we do
not have complete knowledge of the queuing delay distributions and we want to estimate with
a model with only a few parameters. So we have
f1i(w) =
Mi∑
k=1
αikha1ik,b1ik(w), (5)
f2i(w) =
Li∑
l=1
βilha2il,b2il(w) (6)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . In (5) and (6), Mi and Li represent the number of mixture components in
the forward- and reverse path of the ith master-slave link respectively. The variables {αik}Mik=1
2If the master-slave link is not attacked, then τi = 0.
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and {βil}Lil=1 represent the unknown mixing coefficients at the forward- and reverse path of
the ith master-slave link respectively with
∑Mi
k=1 αik = 1 and
∑Li
l=1 βil = 1 and the variables
{a1ik, b1ik}Mik=1, {a2il, b2il}Lil=1 represent the corresponding unknown parameters of the Gamma
distributions. Let Θ denote the vector containing the desired parameter to be estimated δ, the set
of unknown fixed delays {di}Ni=1, the set of unknown delay attack magnitudes for the master-slave
links {τi}Ni=1, the set of unknown mixing coefficients {αi1, · · · , αiMi}Ni=1, {βi1, · · · , βiLi}Ni=1,
the set of unknown Gamma distributions parameters {a1i1, · · · , a1iMi}Ni=1, {b1i1, · · · , b1iMi}Ni=1,
{a2i1, · · · , a2iLi}Ni=1, {b2i1, · · · , b2iLi}Ni=1, and the set of unknown binary state variables {ηi}
defined shortly. We have
Θ = [ΨT,αT,βT,ηT]T, (7)
where
Ψ =
[
δ, d1, · · · , dN , τ1, · · · , τN ,aT1, bT1,aT2, bT2
]T
, (8)
a1 = [a111, · · · , a11M1 , a121, · · · , a12M2 , · · · , a1NMN ]T , (9)
b1 = [b111, · · · , b11M1 , b121, · · · , b12M2 , · · · , b1NMN ]T , (10)
a2 = [a211, · · · , a21L1 , a221, · · · , a22L2 , · · · , a2NLN ]T , (11)
b2 = [b211, · · · , b21L1 , b221, · · · , b22L2 , · · · , b2NLN ]T , (12)
α = [α11, · · · , α1M1 , α21, · · · , α2M2 , · · · , αNMN ]T , (13)
β = [β11, · · · , β1L1 , β21, · · · , β2L2 , · · · , βNLN ]T , (14)
η = [η1, η2, · · · , ηN ]T. (15)
The ith element of η is 1 if the ith master-slave link is attacked, otherwise it has a value 0
indicating that the link is not attacked. Let u and v denote the vectors of all the forward and
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reverse observations at the slave node. We can represent them by
u = [u11, · · · , u1P , u21, · · · , uNP ]T, (16)
v = [v11, · · · , v1P , v21, · · · , vNP ]T, (17)
and
y = [uT,vT]T. (18)
In our work, we seek an estimator δˆ(y) of the phase offset δ based on the observations y which
are generally effected by all the deterministic parameters in Θ. We characterize the performance
of δˆ(y) via the conditional mean squared error (MSE) metric defined as
R
(
δˆ(y), δ
)
= E
{[
δ − δˆ(y)
]2∣∣∣∣Θ} , (19)
where E {.} denotes the expectation operator.
III. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION AND DATA FUSION
In this section, we develop our robust approach. First, we present the optimum scheme for
fusing information exchanged with the various master nodes when we know which master-slave
communication links are attacked. The approach employs our previous results on unattacked links
and on when to use data from attacked links in general estimation problems. To pull together these
ideas, a modified EM algorithm for identifying the links which have been attacked incorporates
our developed theory on fusing the attacked and unattacked data. We first present an important
theorem, which we use for the remainder of this paper.
Theorem 1. There is no gain in estimating δ using the information from the attacked master-slave
communication links (For proof: See Theorem 1 of [18]).
As a consequence of Theorem 1, we see that discarding the observations from the attacked
links does not affect the performance of an estimator of the phase offset δ.
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A. Genie approach
Let’s assume that we have prior knowledge of the master-slave links which have been attacked,
as well as complete knowledge of the forward- and reverse queuing delay pdfs f1i(w) and f2i(w)
for all N master-slave links i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Following Theorem 1, we discard the observations
from the attacked links. We employ the unattacked minimax optimum estimator presented in
[5] to present an approach which can provide a very useful but generally unachievable genie
lower bound on the performance of estimating δ in our general problem. We first present some
definitions and results from [5].
Definition 1. (Vector location Parameter problem): Suppose we want to estimate a linear
combination cTθ of the unknown parameters contained in the components of the vector θ ∈ RM
(where c ∈ RM is a constant vector), based on observations x ∈ RN . If the observations have
a pdf of the form
f(x|θ) = f0(x−Gθ) (20)
for some N×M matrix G, and function f0(.), such a problem is referred to as a vector location
parameter problem [5].
Definition 2. We say that an estimator g(x) of cTθ is shift invariant if for the same matrix G
used in (20),
g(x + Gh) = g(x) + cTh (21)
for all h ∈ RM [5].
The conditional MSE of an estimator g(x) of cTθ can be written as
R(g(x), cTθ) =
∫
RN
[g(x)− cTθ]2f(x|θ)dx (22)
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and the maximum MSE is defined as
M(g(x)) = sup
θ∈RM
R(g(x), cTθ). (23)
While the conditional and maximum MSE are in general different for an estimator, it was shown
in [5] that for a shift invariant estimator they are equal. Guruswamy et. al [5] derived a useful
optimum estimator for the vector location parameter estimation problem without any attacks.
The optimum estimator is presented below for convenience.
Theorem 2. For the vector location parameter problem, the estimator
g∗(x) =
∫
RM [c
Tθ]f(x|θ)dθ∫
RM f(x|θ)dθ
, (24)
satisfies the following properties:
• g∗(x) is shift invariant. In fact, all the estimators used in practice for POE are shift invariant.
• g∗(x) minimizes the maximum MSE for any estimate cTθ.
• Among all estimators of cTθ that are shift invariant, g∗(x) achieves the minimum conditional
MSE.
• g∗(x) is unbiased, i.e., E
{[
g∗(x)− cTθ] |θ} = 0.
For proof, see [5].
The estimator g∗(x) presented in (24) of cTθ is optimum in terms of minimizing the conditional
mean-squared estimation error over all values of the unknown parameters among shift invariant
estimators. In this paper, we use the optimum vector location parameter estimator presented in
Theorem 2 along with the result from Theorem 1 to get a lower bound on the MSE for a POE
scheme in the presence of delay attacks.
If we have prior information regarding the links which have been attacked, Theorem 1 tells
us to only retain information from the unattacked links. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that the K master-slave links indexed by {nk}Kk=1 are unattacked, the observed data from these
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links can be represented as
uK = [un11, · · · , un1P , un21, · · · , unKP ]T, (25)
vK = [vn11, · · · , vn1P , vn21, · · · , vnKP ]T, (26)
yK = [u
T
K ,v
T
K ]
T. (27)
From (3) and (4), we can represent yK as
yK = Gθ + wK , (28)
where θ = [δ, dn1 , · · · , dnK ]T represents the vector of unknown parameters and wK is a random
KP × 1 vector given by wK = [w1n11, w1n12, · · · , w1n1P , w1n21, · · · , w1nKP , w2n11, w2n12, · · · ,
w2n1P , w2n21, · · · , w2nKP ]T. The matrix G is given by
G =
 1KP×1 AKP×K
−1KP×1 AKP×K
 (29)
where 1KP×1 represents a vector of size KP × 1 with all the elements equal to 1, AKP×K =
1P×1 ⊗ IK×K, with ⊗ representing the Kronecker delta product, and IK×K represents an identity
matrix of size K. We observe that (28) has a pdf which can be represented as
fyK (yK |θ) = fw(yK −Gθ). (30)
Assuming the components of the vector w in (28) are independent and identically distributed,
fw(w) is given by
fw(w) =
K∏
i=1
P∏
j=1
f1ni(w1nij)f2ni(w2nij). (31)
So our problem of fusing known-attack-status information from multiple master nodes falls
under the class of vector location parameter estimation problems. Therefore, we use the optimal
estimator given in Theorem 2 to obtain the phase offset estimate.
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In our problem, we have θ = [δ, dn1 , · · · , dnK ]T, so we employ c = [1, 0, · · · 0]T. By applying
Theorem 2, we can then obtain the optimum estimator of δ from the observations yK as
δˆ(yK) =
∫
δ
δΩ(δ,uK ,vK)dδ∫
δ
Ω(δ,uK ,vK)dδ
, (32)
where Ω(δ,uK ,vK) is defined as follows
Ω(δ,uK ,vK) =
K∏
i=1
∫
dni
P∏
j=1
[f1ni(unij − δ − dni)f2ni(vnij + δ − dni)] d(dni).
We refer to the estimator presented in (32) as the genie-optimum estimator. The genie optimum
estimator gives us a lower bound on the MSE for a POE scheme in the presence of delay attacks.
We use this bound to evaluate the performance of our proposed POE scheme.
B. EM-algorithm
In practice, we do not have prior information regarding the links which have been attacked.
It is necessary to identify these links before applying the optimal estimator presented in (32).
In our work, we use the EM algorithm combined with the random relaxation proposed in [17]
for identifying these links. For ease of notation, we define ha,b(w|θ1, θ2) = ha,b(w − θ1 − θ2),
where θ1 and θ2 represent unknown deterministic parameters. The log-likelihood function of Θ
evaluated using the observed data y is given by
L(Θ|y) =
N∑
i=1
P∑
j=1
ηi ln
[
Mi∑
k=1
αikha1ik,b1ik(uij|δ, di, τi)
Li∑
l=1
βilha2il,b2il(vij| − δ, di)
]
= +(1− ηi) ln
[
Mi∑
k=1
αikha1ik,b1ik(uij|δ, di)
Li∑
l=1
βilha2il,b2il(vij| − δ, di)
]
. (33)
Recall ηi represents an unknown deterministic binary variable. Based on the power of a post
processing (to be discussed later) which is able to undo this modification, we introduce a
relaxation that essentially replaces each ηi with a real valued variable pii = Pr(ηi = 1) ∈ [0, 1]
which represents the probability of the ith link being attacked. Let Θpi = [ΨT,αT,βT,piT]T,
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where pi = [pi1, pi2, · · · , piN ]T. The log-likelihood function of Θpi given the observed vector y is
given by
L(Θpi|y) =
N∑
i=1
P∑
j=1
ln
[
pii
Mi∑
k=1
Li∑
l=1
αikha1ik,b1ik(uij|δ, di, τi)βilha2il,b2il(vij| − δ, di)
= + (1− pii)
Mi∑
k=1
Li∑
l=1
αikha1ik,b1ik(uij|δ, di)βilha2il,b2il(vij| − δ, di)
]
. (34)
A maximum-likelihood estimate of Θpi can then be obtained using
Θˆpi = arg max
Θpi
L(Θpi|y). (35)
We use the EM algorithm to evaluate (35) to get the maximum likelihood estimate Θˆpi. We
introduce the latent vector z = [z11, z12, · · · , z1P , z21, · · · , zNP ]T, where zij = 1 indicates that the
jth two-way timing exchange at the ith master-slave link was attacked, while zij = 0 indicates that
it was not attacked, and the latent vector r = [r11, r12, · · · , r1P , r21, · · · , rNP ]T where rij = k in-
dicates that uij is from the kth mixture component in the ith forward queuing delay pdf, and rij ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,Mi}. Similarly we introduce the latent vector s = [s11, s12, · · · , s1P , s21, · · · , sNP ]T
where sij = k indicates that vij is from the kth mixture component in the ith reverse queuing delay
pdf, and sij ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Li}. The EM algorithm is an iterative approach which alternates between
performing an expectation (E) step and a maximization (M) step to calculate the maximum-
likelihood estimate of a parameter. The steps of the algorithm are described below:
1) Q-step: In this step, we evaluate the expected log-likelihood function Q(Θpi|Θgpi) averaged
over the unknown data {z, r, s}, and conditioned on the current estimate of Θpi represented
by Θgpi. We have
Q(Θpi|Θgpi) = E
{
L
(
Θpi|z, r, s,y)
∣∣y,Θ(g))} , (36)
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where L(Ωpi|z, r, s,y) is defined as
L(Θpi|z, r, s,y) =
N∑
i=1
P∑
j=1
χ{zij=1} ln
[
piiαrijβsijha1rij b1rij (uij|δ, di, τi)ha2sij b2sij (vij| − δ, di)
]
+χ{zij=0} ln
[
(1− pii)αrijβsijha1rij b1rij (uij|δ, di)ha2sij b2sij (vij| − δ, di)
]
,
(37)
where y is defined in (18), and χzij represents the indicator function defined as
χ{zij=1} =

1 if zij = 1
0 otherwise.
(38)
The expected log-likelihood function Q(Θpi|Θgpi) can then be expressed as
Q(Θpi|Θgpi) =
N∑
i=1
P∑
j=1
Mi∑
k=1
Li∑
l=1
a
(1)
ijkl ln [piiαikβilha1ik,b1ik(uij|δ, di, τi)ha2il,b2il(vij| − δ, di)]
+a
(0)
ijkl ln [(1− pii)αikβilha1ik,b1ik(uij|δ, di)ha2il,b2il(vij| − δ, di)] , (39)
where a(1)ijkl and a
(0)
ijkl are defined as
a
(1)
ijkl = Prob{χ{zij=1} = 1, αik = rij, βil = sij|Θgpi},
=
pigi α
g
ikβ
g
ilhag1ik,b
g
1ik
(uij|δg, dgi , τ gi )hag2il,bg2il(vij| − δg, d
g
i )∑Mi
ki=1
∑Li
li=1
αgikiβ
g
ili
hag2ili ,b
g
2ili
(vij| − δg, dgi )Dki
,
a
(0)
ijkl = Prob{χ{zij=1} = 0, αik = rij, βil = sij|Θgpi},
=
(1− pigi )αgikβgilhag1ik,bg1ik(uij|δg, d
g
i )hag2il,b
g
2il
(vij| − δg, dgi )∑Mi
ki=1
∑Li
li=1
αgikiβ
g
ili
hag2ili ,b
g
2ili
(vij| − δg, dgi )Dki
,
Dki =
[
pigi hag1iki ,b
g
1iki
(uij|δg, dgi , τ gi ) + (1− pigi )hag2iki ,bg2iki (uij|δ
g, dgi )
]
. (40)
2) M-step: After we calculate the expected log-likelihood with respect to the unknown data,
we update the value of the vector parameter Θˆpi by maximizing the expected log-likelihood
function Q(Θpi|Θgpi). We have
Θˆpi =
[
ΨˆT, αˆT, βˆT, pˆiT
]
= arg max
Θpi
Q(Θpi|Θgpi). (41)
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We first solve the maximization problem to update pˆii, we have
∂Q(Θpi|Θgpi)
dpii
= 0, (42)
P∑
j=1
Mi∑
k=1
Li∑
l=1
a
(1)
ijkl
pii
− a
(0)
ijkl
1− pii = 0. (43)
Solving the above equation, we get the updated estimate of pii as
pˆii =
1
P
P∑
j=1
Mi∑
k=1
Li∑
l=1
a
(1)
ijkl. (44)
To estimate the mixing coefficient αˆik, we introduce the Lagrange multiplier with the
constraint
∑Mi
ki=1
αiki = 1, and solve the equation
∂
∂αik
[
Q(Θpi|Θgpi)− λ
(
Mi∑
ki=1
αiki − 1
)]
= 0. (45)
We then have
P∑
j=1
Li∑
l=1
1
αik
(
a
(1)
ijkl + a
(0)
ijkl
)
− λ = 0, (46)
P∑
j=1
Li∑
l=1
(
a
(1)
ijkl + a
(0)
ijkl
)
= λαik. (47)
Summing over k on both sides, we can find the value of λ. We have
λ
Mi∑
k=1
αik =
Mi∑
k=1
P∑
j=1
Li∑
l=1
(
a
(1)
ijkl + a
(0)
ijkl
)
(48)
λ =
Mi∑
k=1
P∑
j=1
Li∑
l=1
(
a
(1)
ijkl + a
(0)
ijkl
)
(49)
= P. (50)
So, the updated estimate is given by
αˆik =
1
P
P∑
j=1
Li∑
l=1
(
a
(1)
ijkl + a
(0)
ijkl
)
. (51)
Following a similar process for βil, we can get the updated estimate of βˆil as
βˆil =
1
P
P∑
j=1
Mi∑
k=1
(
a
(1)
ijkl + a
(0)
ijkl
)
. (52)
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Calculating the just described updates for all the N master-slave links, we obtain the
updated estimate of αˆ and βˆ. An updated estimate of Ψˆ can be obtained by solving the
equation
∇ΨQ(Θpi|Θgpi) = 0. (53)
In order to solve (53), we use the Newton-Raphson method to get an updated estimate of
the parameter Ψˆ. We choose the initial point as Ψ(0) = Ψˆg. We then update the value at
the (t+ 1)th stage using
Ψˆ(t+1) = Ψˆ(t) − κt
[∇2ΨQ(Θ(t)pi |Θgpi)]−1∇ΨQ(Θ(t)pi |Θgpi), (54)
where Θ(t)pi = [ΨˆT, αˆT, βˆT, pˆiT]T and κt ∈ (0, 1) is the tth step-size computed using a
backtracking line search [21]. Repeating the calculation in (54) until Ψˆ(t) converges, the
limit is a solution for (53).
The convergence analysis for the EM algorithm appears in [22]. By iteratively alternating between
the E-step and M-step, we obtain the maximum-likelihood estimate of Θpi. We then classify the
links based on the converged value of pˆi. Specifically, we declare the ith master-slave link as
attacked if pii > (1 − pii), else we declare the link as unattacked. Following Theorem 1, we
discard the observations from the attacked links. We then use the estimated values of aˆ1, bˆ1, aˆ2,
bˆ2, αˆ and βˆ in the optimal estimator presented in (32) to estimate the phase offset δ. As our
problem is not necessarily convex, proper initialization of the various parameters is crucial for
the EM algorithm to ensure convergence to the global minimum instead of a local minimums.
We present a simple ad-hoc approach in Section III-C for initializing the parameters for the EM
algorithm. We observe from simulations that the proposed ad-hoc scheme seems to avoid local
minimums. The complete algorithm is summarized in Section III-D.
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C. Initialization for the EM-algorithm
We now present a simple ad-hoc approach to fix the initial values of Θpi denoted by Θ
(g)
pi
for the EM algorithm described in Section III. We assume prior knowledge regarding the
mean and covariance of the forward- and reverse queuing delays for each of the master-slave
communication links. Consider the ith master-slave communication link:
1) Initialization of α(g) and β(g): We set the initial values of
{
α
(g)
ik
}Mi
k=1
as 1/Mi and the
initial values of
{
β
(g)
il
}Li
l=1
as 1/Li. This procedure is repeated for all the master-slave
communication links in both the forward- and reverse path to get α(g) and β(g).
2) Initialization of a(g)1 , b
(g)
1 , a
(g)
2 , b
(g)
2 : The queuing delay pdf in the forward path is given
by (5). Since we have prior information regarding the mean (µ1i) and variance (σ21i) of the
queuing delay distributions, we have
µ1i =
Mi∑
k=1
a1ikb1ik
Mi
, (55)
σ21i =
Mi∑
k=1
(a1ikb
2
1ik + a
2
1ikb
2
1ik)
Mi
− a21ikb21ik. (56)
Solving the above equations, we can get our estimate of {a(g)1ik}Lik=1 and {b(g)1il}Lil=1. Following
a similar procedure for the reverse path, we obtain {a(g)2ik}Mik=1 and {b(g)2il}Lil=1. This procedure
is repeated for all the master-slave communication links in both the forward- and reverse
path to get a(g)1 , b
(g)
1 , a
(g)
2 , and b
(g)
2 .
3) Initialization of pi: We use the POE scheme proposed in [20] in our ad-hoc scheme to
initialize pi(g). The POE scheme presented in [20], referred to as an L-estimator is based
on a linear combination of the order statistics. These POE schemes offer near optimal
performance and only require information regarding the mean and covariance matrix of
the queuing delays3. The steps to fix pi(g) are as follows:
3A brief discussion of the POE scheme proposed in [20] is presented in Appendix A.
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• We determine the relative phase offset δˆi for all the N master-slave communication
links using the L-estimators.
• Since less than half of the master-slave links are attacked, the median of these N
phase offsets should correspond to a phase offset estimate which is unattacked. We
represent this value by δˆmed.
• Representing the root mean sqaure error of the phase offset estimate determined by the
median as σmedP (See (73) in Appendix). If we observe that
∣∣∣δˆmed − δˆi∣∣∣ ≥ 2σmedP,
we declare the link as attacked, else we declare the link as unattacked.
4) Initialization of δ: We fix the value of δ(g) as δˆmed.
5) Initialization of d, τ : If the ith master-slave link is identified as unattacked, we fix the
initial values of di and τi as follows:
d
(g)
i =
1
2P
P∑
j=1
(uij + vij)− (µ1i + µ2i)
2
, (57)
τ
(g)
i = 0. (58)
If the ith master-slave link is identified as attacked, we have
d
(g)
i =
1
P
P∑
j=1
vij + δ
(g) − µ2i, (59)
τ
(g)
i =
1
P
P∑
j=1
uij − δ(g) − d(g)i − µ1i. (60)
This procedure is repeated for all the master-slave communication links to get d(g) and
τ (g).
D. Final Algorithm
The steps of the proposed POE scheme is presented in this section. We repeat the algorithm
until the difference between the complete data log likelihood at consecutive iterations becomes
less than some threshold.
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1: Initialize the parameter vector Θpi as Θ
(g)
pi .
2: Initialize the present value of the log likelihood LLFpres using (34) and Θ
(g)
pi .
3: Initialize the previous value of the log likelihood LLFprev = −∞ and fix a threshold value
 to determine when to stop.
4: while |LLFpres − LLFprev| ≥  do
5: for i = 1 : N ; k = 1 : Mi; l = 1 : Li; j = 1 : P do
6: compute a(1)ijkl and a
(0)
ijkl using (40) based on current estimate Θ
(g)
pi .
7: end for
8: for i = 1 : N do
9: update the current estimate of pˆii using (44).
10: end for
11: for i = 1 : N, k = 1 : Mi do
12: update the current estimate of αˆik using (51).
13: end for
14: for i = 1 : N, l = 1 : Li do
15: update the current estimate of βˆil using (52).
16: end for
17: Update the current estimate of Ψˆ by solving (53).
18: Update LLFprev ← LLFpres.
19: Update Θ(g)pi based on the updated values of Ψˆ, αˆ, βˆ, pˆi.
20: Update the log likelihood LLFpres using (34) and the updated Θ
(g)
pi .
21: end while
22: for i = 1 : N do
23: if pˆii ≥ (1− pˆii) then
24: Identify the ith master-slave communication link as attacked.
25: else
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26: Identify the ith master-slave communication link as unattacked.
27: end if
28: end for
29: Discard the information from master-slave communication links identified as attacked.
30: Using the maximum likelihood estimates of aˆ1, bˆ1, aˆ2, bˆ2, αˆ and βˆ, compute the estimate
of phase offset using (32).
In summary, we use the EM algorithm for identifying the master-slave communication links
which have been subject to delay attacks, and employ the optimal vector location parameter
estimator to estimate the phase offset of the slave node.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed POE scheme under various net-
work scenarios. We compare the performance of the proposed POE scheme to other conventional
robust POE schemes available in the literature along with the lower bounds presented in Section
III.
A. Generating the random queuing delays
We follow the approach given in [5], [20] for generating the random queuing delays in the
backhaul networks. We assume a Gigabit ethernet network consisting of a cascade of 10 switches
between the master and slave node. Each switch is assumed to be a store-and-forward switch
that implements strict priority queuing. We mainly consider the background cross traffic flows.
In cross traffic flows, fresh background traffic is injected at each switch along the master-
slave path, and this traffic exits the master-slave path at the subsequent switch [see 3-switch
example in Fig. 1]. The arrival times and sizes of background traffic packets injected at each
switch were assumed to be statistically independent of traffic at other switches. In the context
of LTE backhaul networks, the traffic generated by other users of the network can be typically
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Traf. Model Packet Sizes (in Bytes) % of total load
TM-1 {64, 576, 1518} {80%, 5%, 15%}
TM-2 {64, 576, 1518} {30%, 10%, 60%}
TABLE I: Composition of background packets in the traffic models
modeled as cross traffic flows. With regard to the packet size distributions of background traffic,
we use Traffic Models 1 (TM1) and 2 (TM2) from the ITU-T recommendation G.8261 [23]
for cross traffic flows, as described in Table I. For the load factor, i.e., the percentage of the
link capacity consumed by background traffic, we consider values between 20–80% of the link
capacity. We assume that the interarrival times between packets in all background traffic flows
follow exponential distributions, and set the rate parameter of each exponential distribution
to obtain the desired load factor [5]. Empirical pdfs of the queuing delays, shown in Fig. 2,
were obtained using a custom MATLAB-based network simulator. Our simulations assumed
that all switches were store-and-forward switches that implemented strict priority queuing. In
our simulations, we consider scenarios where the distribution of queuing delays in the forward
and reverse paths are symmetrical and equal for all the master-slave communication links, i.e.,
f1i(w) = f2i(w) = fw(w).
B. Approaches from the literature employed for comparison
We now describe the various approaches that we compare in our simulations:
1) Genie optimum approach: In this POE scheme, we have prior knowledge of the links which
have been attacked, and discard the information from these links. The phase offset δˆ(y)
is then estimated using (32). We should mention here that this approach gives a bound on
the best achievable performance of a POE scheme.
2) EM minimax approach-I: In this POE scheme, we have prior knowledge of the density
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functions of the queuing delays. We try to identify the links which have been attacked
using the EM algorithm, and fuse information from the unattacked links using (32).
3) EM minimax approach-II: In this POE scheme, we try to identify the links which have
been attacked as well as the mixture components of the queuing delays using the EM
algorithm, and fuse information from the unattacked links using (32).
4) Fault-tolerant algorithm approach: This POE scheme was proposed in [9]. In this scheme,
we have prior knowledge regarding the number of attackers (say M ). We first calculate
the phase offset estimate for each of the individual master-slave links (using the sample
mean), and we discard the M lowest and M largest values of the phase offset, and form
the estimate of δˆ(y) from the remaining links deemed to be non-faulty.
5) Median approach: This POE scheme was proposed in [10]. In this scheme, we first estimate
the phase offset for each of the individual master-slave links (using the sample mean). We
then estimate δˆ(y) as the median of estimated phase offsets from the N master-slave links.
C. Simulation results
We carried out simulations for various network scenarios under both TM-1 and TM-2 for
different loads and for various sample sizes. In our simulations, the delay attack magnitude for
each attacker is chosen uniformly from the interval [0.5, 2.0]
⋃
[−2.0,−0.5] µs. The results are
presented in Figure 3–4. In the case of 20% load, under both TM-1 and TM-2, we approximate
the queuing delay distribution by an exponential random variable (Gamma distribution with shape
parameter as 1), while for the remaining cases, we approximate the queuing delay distribution
by a 2-component Gamma mixture. As we can see from the results, the proposed POE scheme
performs quite well under all scenarios and is relatively close to the genie optimum estimator
under both network models. We briefly discuss the results:
1) In Figure 3, we study the case of N = 3 with one master-slave communication link being
attacked under TM-1 for different loads. The proposed POE schemes perform significantly
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better than the median and fault tolerant algorithm (FTA) approaches under various loads.
We also observe that there is no noticeable difference in performance between the median
and FTA approaches. This is mainly due to the fact that in both these approaches, the
smallest and largest phase offset estimates are discarded in this particular scenario.
2) In Figure 4, we study the case of N = 3 with one master-slave communication link being
attacked under TM-2 for different loads. In this scenario, we see a noticeable gain in
performance for the proposed POE scheme under low loads (20% and 40%), while at high
loads all the POE schemes exhibit an estimation error close to the lower bounds. This
could be due to the queuing distributions approximating a Gaussian distribution under
high loads in TM-2. In such a scenario, the sample mean becomes the optimum method
for fusing information from multiple master-slave communication links.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a useful lower bound on the MSE for any phase offset
estimation scheme in the presence of delay attacks and we show approaches that provide
performance close to the bound. In particular, we presented a robust POE scheme that employs the
EM algorithm along with the optimal approach for fusing information from multiple unattacked
master nodes when all pdfs in the model are known. The proposed scheme does not require
complete information regarding the distributions of the queuing delays, performs better than
the conventional schemes available in the literature and exhibits a mean square estimation error
close to the lower bounds in a number of network scenarios. Furthermore, the two-way message
exchange is employed in a number of synchronization protocols including NTP [2], TinySeRSync
[10] and the Timing-sync Protocol for Sensor Networks (TPSN) [25]. The proposed POE scheme
can be easily modified for these protocols.
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APPENDIX
BRIEF DISCUSSION REGARDING THE L-ESTIMATORS
The POE scheme presented in [20], referred to as an L-estimator is based on a linear
combination of the order statistics. The general form of these estimators for estimating the
phase offset in the ith master-slave communication link is given by
δˆi = c
T
1 u˜i − cT2 v˜i + η, (61)
where we have
ui = [ui1, ui2, · · · , uiP ]T (62)
vi = [vi1, vi2, · · · , viP ]T (63)
w1i = [w1i1, w1i2, · · · , w1iP ]T (64)
w2i = [w2i1, w2i2, · · · , w2iP ]T (65)
and u˜i and v˜i contains all the order statistics of ui and vi respectively, ordered from smallest
to largest and defined as follows:
u˜i = [min{ui}, · · · ,max{ui}]T . (66)
c1, c2 are weight vectors and η is a scalar constant. Define
µki = E[w˜ki]; Ski = cov[w˜ki], (67)
S12i = E [(w˜1i − µ1i) (w˜2i − µ2i)] (68)
for k = 1, 2. Let
c =
c1
c2
 , Si =
 S1i −S12i
−ST12i S2i
 . (69)
We now present an important result from [20] that is used for estimating the optimal values of
c1 and c2 which minimize the MSE of the estimator given in (61).
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Fig. 1: Example of a three switch network with cross traffic flows. The solid red lines indicate
network links, dashed blue lines indicate the direction of background traffic flows, and dotted
green line represents the direction of synchronization traffic flow.
Theorem 3. The optimum values of c1, c2 and η that minimize the mean square error (MSE)
of the estimator given in (61), under the constraint of constant bias4 arec1
c2
 = S−1i AT (AS−1i AT )γ, (70)
η = cT1µ2i − cT2µ1i, (71)
where,
A =
1TP 1TP
1TP −1TP
 , γ = [1, 0]T , (72)
and the resultant optimum estimator has an MSE given by
MSE(δˆi) = γT (AS−1i A
T )−1γ. (73)
For proof, see [20].
4The bias can become unbounded if not unbiased.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2: Empirical pdf of queuing delays under various loads. (a) TM-1 network model. (b) TM-2
network model. (c) TM-1 network model. (d) TM-2 network model.
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